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Abstract
Airborne collision avoidance systems provide an onboard
safety net should normal air traffic control procedures fail to
keep aircraft separated. These systems are widely deployed
and have been constantly refined over the past three decades,
usually in response to near misses or mid-air collisions. Re-
cent years have seen security research increasingly focus on
aviation, identifying that key wireless links—some of which
are used in collision avoidance—are vulnerable to attack. In
this paper, we go one step further to understand whether an
attacker can remotely trigger false collision avoidance alarms.
Primarily considering the next-generation Airborne Collision
Avoidance System X (ACAS X), we adopt a modelling ap-
proach to extract attacker constraints from technical standards
before simulating collision avoidance attacks against standard-
ized ACAS X code. We find that in 44% of cases, an attacker
can successfully trigger a collision avoidance alert which on
average results in a 590 ft altitude deviation; when the aircraft
is at lower altitudes, this success rate rises considerably to
79%. Furthermore, we show how our simulation approach can
be used to help defend against attacks by identifying where
attackers are most likely to be successful.
1 Introduction
Over the past decade, security research in aviation has high-
lighted a raft of issues, predominantly around unauthenti-
cated wireless communication channels. These channels en-
able aircraft-to-ground or aircraft-to-aircraft communications,
which in turn supports air traffic control (ATC) surveillance
activities. The global aviation infrastructure is moving to-
wards even higher usage of existing and planned wireless
links, led by regional and international airspace moderniza-
tion efforts and specified by the International Civil Aviation
Organization’s Global Air Navigation Plan [26].
As its most vital function, ATC keeps aircraft safe by ensur-
ing they are sufficiently separated both laterally and vertically.
To fulfil this task, controllers require an accurate surveillance
picture of their controlled airspace, which is obtained using
several independent voice and data link communications. De-
spite this redundancy and highly professionalized services,
there are still occasions where aircraft end up too close to
each other and need to be deconflicted immediately. In such
situations, safety systems onboard the aircraft called collision
avoidance systems (CAS) use avionic data links to automati-
cally communicate with the nearby aircraft. This process then
leads to CAS issuing compulsory instructions to the pilots of
each aircraft in order to deconflict the situation.
The decision to use existing ATC communication signals
for CAS purposes was led by the US Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) in 1981 and developed into the Traffic
Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). Historically,
the need for the introduction and improvement of airborne
CAS has evolved from near misses or mid-air collisions of
aircraft. Consequently, both technology and rules have seen
changes, for example in response to the Überlingen disaster of
2002 [19], after which following CAS instructions was made
compulsory for pilots. Some aircraft even automatically fol-
low deconflicting measures, flying the necessary manuevers
directly and without pilot input [2, 9].
With the move towards both digitalization and automation
in the air, the involved systems are increasingly subject to
scrutiny by the security community. This is illustrated by a
growing body of literature examining the underlying wireless
communication links (a recent survey is found in [48]).
Since all current and next generation CAS rely on unauthen-
ticated wireless links such as Automatic Dependent Surveil-
lance – Broadcast (ADS-B) or the Secondary Surveillance
Radar (SSR) Modes A, C and S, the input for CAS is widely
considered insecure. However, a comprehensive security anal-
ysis explicitly examining airborne collision avoidance has
been notably absent thus far. To fill this crucial gap in the
literature, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of the real-
world impact of wireless attacks on CAS, specifically the next-
generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS
X), which is due to be rolled out globally in this decade [44].
In our analysis, we focus on the requirements and feasibil-
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ity of wireless attacks on airborne CAS. By investigating both
theoretical and practical environmental conditions, we can
illustrate which types of attack, and which outcomes, are pos-
sible under realistic constraints. Based on this framework, we
develop a simulator-based approach to test attacks on official
code from the ACAS X standard. The input to our simulator
is provided by 6000 randomly sampled real-world trajectories
extracted from the OpenSky Network, which were collected
from six airports in several countries [43].
Our work demonstrates that an adversary can successfully
conduct attacks on state-of-the-art airborne CAS but that sys-
tem design ensures that the ability to have fine-grained control
over a target aircraft is restricted in the real world. The prac-
tical investigations show that an attacker can trigger a CAS
alert in 44% of our simulated runs rising to 79% when we
focus on aircraft flying at vulnerable lower altitudes. On av-
erage, attacks caused a 590 ft deviation from the original,
non-interfered trajectory. Finally, our analysis provides novel
insights into effective detection and mitigation of such attacks,
e.g. the identification of vulnerable areas around airports.
We make the following contributions:
1. We provide theoretical bounds on successful CAS at-
tacks and the requirements placed on a capable attacker.
2. We construct a novel collision avoidance threat simulator
based around officially standardized ACAS X code, fed
with real-world aircraft trajectories from the OpenSky
Network. Using the simulator, we identify the impact of
realistic attacks on targeted aircraft.
3. Based on modelling and simulator analysis, we consider
the most effective countermeasures to CAS attacks, in-
cluding concrete recommended procedures to identify
and mitigate the most vulnerable parts of the airspace.
In the next section, we cover the relevant background and
related work. We outline our threat model in Sec. 3 before
exploring the theoretical constraints on attackers in Sec. 4.
We describe our simulator approach in Sec. 5 and explore the
results from this in Sec. 6. Finally, we offer key insights in
Sec. 7, countermeasures in Sec. 8, and conclude in Sec. 9.
Our test data and ACAS X simulation environment source
code will be made available on publication.
2 Background & Related Work
Although CAS exist in a range of domains, the unique com-
position of aviation infrastructure, particularly the existence
of a central controller in ATC, directly impacts the way these
systems work and how they are used. In this section, we cover
the relevant background, highlighting important systems and
how they fit together. We also note that this paper focuses on
technologies used in non-general aviation (GA). GA aircraft
are heterogenous with regards to equipment, whereas we are
interested in aircraft which are required to use collision avoid-
ance. Specifically, since 2005, ICAO have mandated that all
aircraft with a take off mass exceeding 5700 kg or permitted
to carry more than 19 passengers must be equipped with a
collision avoidance system [22].
2.1 Air Traffic Control Surveillance
ATC is tasked with continuously keeping the aircraft safe.
Typically this is achieved by having human Air Traffic Control
Operators (ATCOs) manage controlled airspace by directly
issuing instructions to aircraft. A range of classifications exist,
with A being the highest class, where only aircraft flying by
instrument are permitted [29].
ATCOs monitor aircraft separation using surveillance tech-
nologies. These comprise a range of tools, but most funda-
mentally Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR) and Secondary
Surveillance Radar (SSR). PSR is a ‘traditional’ radar, usually
comprising a spinning receiver and transmitter, which sends
a high-power beam and monitors round trip time and angle
of arrival [41]. Whilst effective, it provides a limited amount
of information to an ATCO—just the location of aircraft. To
supplement this, ATCOs use SSR, a cooperative surveillance
mechanism whereby ATC interrogate transponders on board
aircraft. These transponders reply with some information de-
termined by the transponder mode.
Mode A/C The oldest mode still in operation, Mode A
responds with a locally assigned transponder code called a
squawk and Mode C with the aircraft’s pressure altitude when
interrogated [21]. Usually these modes are used together, pro-
viding an ATCO with both radar position, altitude and identity
information. As airspace has become busier, Mode A/C alone
is no longer sufficiently to effectively manage aircraft.
Mode S A more recent development is Mode S, which uses
a similar interrogation mechanism but is a more versatile data
link over which ATC can request much more information.
Here, the ground radar interrogates an aircraft for a specific
piece of information, such as its current altitude, heading
or airspeed as recorded by the aircraft, as well as ‘selected’
altitude pilots have set for the flight management system [21,
27]. Furthermore, this mode uses a global identifier known
as a Mode S or ICAO address. This is hard coded into the
transponder and is assigned to a specific aircraft. This mode
allows ATCOs to not only see what an aircraft is doing, but
also its intention.
Automatic Dependent Surveillance—Broadcast In the
past decade, aircraft have begun to adopt the latest surveil-
lance tool known as Automatic Dependent Surveillance—
Broadcast (ADS-B). One of the main features is the inde-
pendent transmission of surveillance data by an aircraft over
the Mode S channel [47]. This allows ATC to monitor air-
craft without constantly interrogating them, especially by ex-
ploiting onboard GPS to report position. However, it is not
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intended to fully replace Mode S, rather help reduce channel
congestion [43]. Importantly, one way ADS-B can be imple-
mented is through an extension of the Mode S transponder
called Mode S Extended Squitter. This allows longer packet
sizes over Mode S to enable ADS-B reporting.
2.2 Collision Avoidance Systems
Despite ATC’s best efforts, sometimes aircraft become too
close and are on a collision course. CAS provide an automated
safety net for aircraft and have been in use since the 1990s.
In this section, we cover the two main CAS implementations
and relevant information on how CAS is used by pilots.
2.2.1 CAS Concepts
In aviation, CAS leverage existing surveillance technologies—
primarily Mode S—to establish nearby aircraft and detect
potential collisions. Despite ACAS X being the next genera-
tion of TCAS, its core functionality and aims are similar.
A simple collision avoidance scenario contains two aircraft:
the ownship and the intruder. In such a scenario we take the
point of view of the ownship, with the intruder being some
nearby aircraft potentially on a collision course. To measure
proximity to the intruder, the ownship has two main phases
of surveillance when using Mode S:
1. Passive surveillance: the default, where CAS listens for
air-ground surveillance link responses from nearby air-
craft and estimates their proximity.
2. Active surveillance: when an intruder has an altitude
within 10000 ft of ownship and is horizontally within
around 3 NM or 60 seconds of the ownship. At this point,
ownship will directly interrogate the intruder in a sim-
ilar way to a Mode S ground station [23]. As part of
this phase, the two aircraft may communicate their in-
tended CAS actions, i.e. to climb or descend, to reduce
the chance of both choosing a similar action.
Crucially, the proximity to nearby aircraft is represented not
by distance but by tau, the time-to-go until the closest point of
approach (CPA) to the ownship [13]. If the CPA falls within
the volume protected by CAS, then the intruder is considered
a threat. We provided a representation of a protected volume
in Fig. 1 and cover the concept of tau in more detail in Sec. 4.
Depending on the speed and altitude of the intruder and
ownship, CAS sets time-to-go boundaries at which it triggers
alerts. These fall into two groups:
• Traffic Advisory (TA): an indication that an intruder is a
potential threat.
• Resolution Advisory (RA): an instruction aiding flight
crew to increase separation from threats. This will take
the form of climbing, leveling off, or descending [24].
Intended Path
Closest Point
of Approach
Traffic Advisory (TA) 
Region
Resolution 
Advisory (RA)
Region
Time to go (tau)
Figure 1: Key collision avoidance system concepts including
the protected volume, tau and the closest point of approach.
Both TAs and RAs are aurally announced in cockpit, with
the RA announcement including specific instructions on the
required action [14]. Some aircraft will also provide visual
guidance on the required RA maneuver.
2.2.2 TCAS
The current CAS implementation in use is the Traffic Alert
and Collision Avoidance system, or TCAS. The system has
existed in some form since the early 1980s, with usage being
mandated worldwide in the aftermath of the 1997 Charkhi
Dadri mid-air collision [31]. The most up-to-date version of
TCAS is TCAS II version 7.1, which provides more complex
logic surrounding RAs, including the ability to reverse them
in the middle of a collision avoidance encounter.1 This was
in part a result of the Überlingen crash in 2002 [15, 20].
TCAS requires a Mode S transponder, but can also monitor
nearby aircraft using Mode A/C [16]. It can issue RAs with
intruder aircraft only equipped with Mode A/C, but these are
not coordinated. Using surveillance input, it uses an extensive
set of rules to monitor nearby aircraft and the threat they
pose, using altitude-based sensitivity levels and a series of
thresholds for time-to-go both vertically and horizontally [17].
Over time, the system has been modified to support more
complex encounters: multi-threat encounters, where RAs are
coordinated between more than two aircraft, sense reversals,
where an RA direction is reversed mid-encounter, and weak-
ening RAs to help reduce displacement [18].
2.2.3 ACAS X
The next generation of collision avoidance is the Airborne
Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X), which is in the pro-
cess of being finalized as standard DO-385 [38]. Eventually,
this system will replace TCAS and although it uses TCAS
performance as a baseline, it provides a number of advantages
over the older system [3, 10].
1We refer to this version as TCAS for the rest of this paper.
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One of the key improvements is to replace TCAS’s rule
based logic for a cost function, implemented using optimized
threat logic lookup tables [4]. TCAS was seen to have be-
come too complex to easily adapt, so the new approach in-
stead has its logic defined by some rules, which are used
with dynamic programming to generate extensive cost ta-
bles [10]. Furthermore, ACAS X provides standardized cost
tables and a Julia implementation, as opposed to the pseu-
docode of TCAS [34, 38].
Another key change is the move towards long-term adapt-
ability. The system is designed with a ‘plug and play’ ap-
proach towards surveillance mechanisms, allowing it to better
support ADS-B or future links [5]. It also has a range of
modes supporting more complex encounters and purely pas-
sive ADS-B based CAS [10].
2.2.4 Collision Avoidance in the Cockpit
Alerts provided by a CAS are very serious and must be treated
with high priority. Flight crew are required to respond to
RAs quickly and accurately; ICAO expect that pilots respond
within five seconds of the first RA and 2.5 seconds of any
subsequent RAs [25]. Such a requirement exists primarily as a
result of the Überlingen accident in 2002; DHL Flight 611 and
Bashkirian Airlines Flight 2937 aircraft collided mid-air when
one followed a TCAS RA to descend whilst the other ignored
a climb RA and instead descended as instructed by ATC. Had
both followed their respective TCAS RAs, they would have
separated [20]. Prior to this incident, the precedence of alerts
from collision avoidance systems was unclear with respect
to ATC instructions. One of the recommendations from the
investigation was to make pilot response to RAs compulsory
unless doing so would endanger the aircraft, as well as never
responding in the opposite direction to an issued RA [19].
Situations in which CAS appears to be behaving abnor-
mally are less well-defined. In a simulator study looking at
how pilots react to attacks on TCAS, results indicated that if
the flight crew believe the system to be malfunctioning they
are likely to reduce the sensitivity to only issue TAs, or even
switch the system to standby [46].
2.2.5 Collision Avoidance for Air Traffic Controllers
Although not the focus of our work, it is important to under-
stand the role that ATC play in collision avoidance encounters.
When an aircraft is responding to an RA, ATC must let the
aircraft carry out the instruction issued by CAS until the pilots
report that they are clear of conflict [28]. As such, RAs can
have knock-on impact for the wider airspace particularly in
busy regions. A collision avoidance encounter between two
aircraft could require ATC to adjust the clearances for many
other aircraft not involved. Finally, ATC can be made aware
of CAS encounters automatically. TCAS transmits RA infor-
mation over the 1030 MHz link, which can be received on the
ground and contains information on the active RA [14].
2.3 Related Work
As pointed out by a recent review article on the security of
various wireless communication links in aviation [48], there
is very little research yet concerning the security of colli-
sion avoidance systems despite long-standing suspicion of its
derived insecurity (discussed, for example, in [49]). As one
explanation for this lack of scrutiny, the authors explain fur-
ther that, thankfully, no real-world security incidents related
to the deployed TCAS have been (publicly) reported. it is
safe to assume that the appearance of such reported incidents
would be strongly motivating and accelerating such research.
Very recently, some researchers from the academic and
the hacking community have started to give more thought
to the problem of current TCAS security. Berges has looked
at the issue from a practical point of view, analyzing the re-
quired technical capabilities required for an attack on collision
avoidance systems on live aircraft [1]. The work argues that
SDR-equipped attackers can successfully trick a target air-
craft to track an attacker-generated aircraft and provides a
GNU-Radio based implementation of such a threat against
open source ADS-B/Mode S decoders. Based on attack-tree
analysis, this attack may lead to near mid-air collisions but
neither the strong physical layer requirements nor the behav-
ior of the TCAS standard implemented in modern aircraft are
considered.
Regarding CAS attacks, Munro has described the funda-
mental methods used for TCAS spoofing, discussing also the
mitigating factors such as pilot performance and suggesting
further impact tests in flight simulators [33]. Such an impact
assessment has recently been performed in a large-scale study
with 30 pilots [46]. Looking at collision avoidance as well as
other safety-critical systems, the study found that real-world
attacks can successfully create significant control impact and
disruption through missed approaches, avoidance maneuvers
and diversions. Similarly, they further increased workload,
distrust in the affected system.
Our work bridges the gap between fundamental wireless
attack primitives on the unsecured radio standards and the
impact of possible attack scenarios on collision avoidance
systems in general. We present a case with regards to the
requirements of attacks on the next generation of collision
avoidance systems, ACAS X, based on theoretical and practi-
cal analysis of this novel standard and its implementation.
3 Threat Model
The consequences of attacking aircraft systems can be se-
vere and unpredictable, especially since airspace is a complex
system. As such, we consider attackers who are determined
to cause disruption or erode safety of aircraft. Since the at-
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tacks presented in this paper are quite complex, they require
specialist equipment and knowledge of the systems.
Typically, an attacker would be located in a static position
within 50 km of an airport in order to be able to successfully
carry out the attack. For reasons discussed in Sec. 4, CAS
attacks do not allow an attacker to ‘control’ an aircraft into
arbitrary climbs and descends. Instead we presume that an at-
tacker is trying to induce dangerous situations moving aircraft
towards busy airspaces, other aircraft or stormy weather. They
may aim to force pilots to turn the system off on account of
spurious alarms. They could target either one or many aircraft
but would need to be in transmission range of any targets.
It is important to note that an attacker will not have full
control over the wider system when carrying out a CAS attack.
Even if they attacked multiple aircraft simultaneously, these
aircraft will also communicate with each other using CAS.
The outcome of this is hard to predict, meaning that an attacker
can only guarantee a starting role in the effects of their attack.
Equipment For hardware, an attacker would need a com-
modity SDR such as the Hack RF, which would be coupled
with an amplifier and antenna capable of transmitting at 500 W
on 1030/1090 MHz, and a method to move the antenna to
track the aircraft [36]. Such antenna and amplifiers are un-
likely to be available off the shelf as they would operate on
restricted frequency bands. These items would cost more as
a result. Custom software would be needed to listen for and
respond to interrogations, manage message sequencing and
monitor target position. This would need to be coupled with
SDR software to encode and transmit Mode S messages.
4 Bounding CAS Injection
While flooding may deny service, injection allows for a subtle
attack that is hard to detect. We now identify the bounds for
an attacker to successfully inject a realistic ghost aircraft,
assuming our attacker wants to inject a false aircraft which
has a sufficiently realistic trajectory to cause a CAS alarm.
4.1 Collision Avoidance Basics
To estimate whether the ownship is on a collision course
with another aircraft, both TCAS and ACAS X use tau, a
calculation of the number of seconds until the CPA between
the aircraft based on current observations. Range tau is the
horizontal time until CPA, calculated using Eq. 1 [35, 39].
tau =− r−
SMOD2
r
min(−6,rdot) (1)
Here, r is the slant range between the interrogating and
interrogated aircraft in nautical miles (NM), SMOD is a hor-
izontal distance modifier defined as 3 NM, and rdot is the
closure speed in knots (kt).
The way in which tau is used differs between TCAS and
ACAS X. For TCAS, tau is compared against thresholds ac-
cording to a sensitivity level from one to seven. Flight crew
usually set the sensitivity level to ‘automatic’ which then al-
lows the current level to be defined by altitude; at each level,
there is a specific tau threshold for TAs and RAs. If an in-
truder aircraft produces a tau below a TA or RA threshold, an
alert will be issued. ACAS X uses a more complex method,
taking tau values as an input into a cost table lookup. The
result is used to determine if an alarm should be sounded and
how ownship should respond. This makes the outcome of a
given tau value harder to predict and thus harder to identify
which ownship positions are more vulnerable. However, by
using the common methods of TCAS and ACAS X we can
calculate some bounds which apply to both systems [10].
4.2 Attacking Collision Avoidance Systems
One of the main challenges in attacking CAS is overcoming
range and bearing calculations. Both are determined by the
ownship based on response characteristics, so it is difficult
for an attacker to inject an aircraft with an arbitrary range or
bearing. However, for Mode S, altitude is reported by the inter-
rogated aircraft so the attacker can at least arbitrarily control
this. For the attack have a predictable effect, the attacker must
respond to a sequence of ownship interrogations appearing to
be an aircraft on a collision course. This will force the CAS
logic on board the target to believe there is a potential intruder
nearby.
To trigger an alarm, the attacker must make the ownship be-
lieve that there is some aircraft flying towards it; this requires
the attacker to transmit a series of interrogation responses
during which the distance between the target and the injected
aircraft decreases. CAS calculates range based on interroga-
tion round-trip time (RTT). As such, attackers have can either
respond to interrogations when they receive it (i.e. as if they
are an aircraft following the normal protocol) or they can
preemptively respond to interrogations in an effort to control
the RTT as perceived by the target aircraft. The ultimate ef-
fect of each is the same, namely that the attacker injects false
aircraft messages, but there is a trade off between the two.
While preemptive response gives a high degree of control
over the position of the false aircraft, it is less reliable as it
needs precise timing to predict when the interrogation will
be and when a transmission is needed to respond; in contrast,
responding when the interrogation arrives at the attacker is
very reliable but loses control over the RTT and thus the slant
distance between the false and target aircraft.
4.3 Modelling Realistic Response Constraints
Our attacker responds to the target aircraft interrogations as
we receive them, so they are effectively constrained. To under-
stand how vulnerable aircraft are to CAS attacks, we identify
these constraints and how they affect attack locations.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the attacker-target aircraft scenario.
First, we model the basic scenario of an attacker injecting
a message. Fig. 2 illustrates this, with an attacker aiming to
inject messages to a target aircraft at slant range r. The RTT
of an interrogation sets the instantaneous slant range, using
r = RTT2c where c is the speed of light in a vacuum, and if we
consider processing delay to be known and thus removed.
At a given point in time, this forms a right-angled triangle,
giving us horizontal distance h and altitude s. For an attack to
be possible and to give the attacker the best possible chance
of success, two conditions on slant distance must be met:
1. r must be decreasing, and,
2. r must be shorter than the active surveillance range.
The first condition is met simply by the attacker position-
ing themselves facing the aircraft path—since arrival and
departure patterns around airports are well-defined, this is
achievable. The second condition is more complex but can be
bounded. Both TCAS and ACAS X define a target to be under
active surveillance when tau is less than 60 seconds, with
ACAS X specifically requiring that the aircraft is airborne
or taking off, as well as meeting vertical and horizontal tau
conditions [35, 40]. For vertical tau, it defines
−(s−4500ft)
min(−1ft/sec, s˙) ≤ 60sec (2)
where s is the altitude difference between the aircraft and
intruder and s˙ is the rate of change of altitude between the two,
which is negative when the altitude difference is decreasing.
For horizontal tau, it defines
−(r−3NM)
min(−6NM/sec, r˙) ≤ 60sec (3)
where r is the slant range and r˙ is the rate of change of slant
range, with negative values occurring for decreasing r.
In both cases, the active surveillance range is smallest when
the two aircraft are effectively flying away from each other—
here, the denominators would both default to the static values
in the minimization functions (due to positive s˙ and r˙), form-
ing a protection area around the aircraft. This is the worst-case
scenario for the attacker; the smallest region in which they
must be located relative to the aircraft in order to be under
active surveillance. Through rearranging both equations, we
can see that the vertical tau region would be s≤ 4560ft and
the horizontal would be r ≤ 3.1NM. If the target aircraft was
instead flying towards the attacker, the denominators would
be larger and so effectively increase the size of the protected
area and reduce the constraints on the attacker—however,
they will maximize their chance by being in the smallest area.
To have the best chance of successfully attacking CAS, the
attacker must be within this protected region. As discussed
above, when using Mode S the attacker has the ability to self-
report altitude. This means that they can ensure they meet
the first condition by injecting appropriate altitudes, or in the
worst case simply matching the target’s altitude.
Falling within the horizontal tau region is more difficult,
however. If we take the base case of r ≤ 3.1NM, or r ≤
18836ft, this could represent any attacker-aircraft position
from the aircraft being 18836 ft overhead to it being at low
altitude almost 3 NM horizontally away.
If the attacker needed to inject a small burst of data, this
would not matter. However, attacking CAS is different to
attacking surveillance systems on their own. Since the system
maintains state over time means that the attacker must be able
to inject messages over a prolonged period—ideally as long
as possible. Because of this, the attacker’s chance of success
is increased if h is larger than s for as long as possible. The
most extreme case of this is where the attacker and target form
a right angled triangle, which is at an altitude of 13306 ft and
range of 2.19 NM. The other end of the spectrum is where
the aircraft is at a minimum height where CAS is available,
nominally 2350 ft, which occurs at a range of 3.08 NM. Using
this we can establish a basic ‘vulnerable’ altitude band in
which the target and attacker are within the active surveillance
range.
5 Simulating Attacks on Collision Avoidance
Having identified a vulnerable range of altitudes, we now
must test if this theory holds against CAS in practice. As
such, we want to investigate whether attackers can inject false
aircraft which cause RAs, and whether target aircraft in the
range 2350-13306 ft are particularly susceptible to attack. To
do this, we use a simulator built on standardized CAS code
from the ACAS X standard [38]. In this section, we outline
our simulator approach to experimentally test the vulnerability
of ACAS X and the constraints on the attacker.
5.1 Simulator Implementation
One of the critical aspects of our work is representativeness of
real collision avoidance systems. TCAS, although widely de-
ployed, requires the implementation from standardized pseu-
docode. One of the aims of ACAS X was to reduce the imple-
mentation uncertainty this introduced, by using Julia rather
than pseudocode, meaning that the specified implementation
can be executed [32]. This can also be tested for correctness
using a standardized a testing suite [6]. We use this Julia
code as our simulator core, which has been checked to ensure
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Trajectory Run
Optimize Handler
Optimize Runner
Run Handler
OpenSky Converter Attacker Generation
Message Interface
ACAS X Code
Figure 3: System diagram of our ACAS X simulation envi-
ronment. Core ACAS X code is from DO-385 standard [38].
it passes all prescriptive (compulsory) tests provided in the
standard.
We wrapped this standardized code in our simulator har-
ness, depicted in Fig. 3. Within a single run, the run handler
converts an input trajectory for the ownship into messages
accepted by ACAS X and combines it with intruder messages.
We discuss how we generate both the ownship trajectories
and input from intruders (namely attackers) below. The run
handler does this conversion for each step, nominally one
second, of a trajectory in the same way that a transponder
would feed messages into ACAS X once per second.
The run handler controls the simulator during a single simu-
lator run over a trajectory. We further wrap this in an optimiza-
tion harness, which allows us to do repeated simulation runs
on a single trajectory, varying attacker parameters in order to
find as optimal an attack as possible. This part of the simulator
implements batch gradient ascent with random restart, thus
repeatedly running according to optimization parameters. We
discuss the details of our optimization approach below.
Testing against ACAS X in this way has an additional
benefit. With the introduction of the cost table approach to
decisions, it is much harder to ‘dry run’ scenarios than with
TCAS. Here, we can simply construct a trajectory and test the
effects of attacks.
5.2 Target Aircraft Trajectories
In order to have a realistic target aircraft, we used flight trajec-
tories extracted from the OpenSky Network over the course of
31 days between 15th Nov. and 15th Dec. 2019. We gathered
the ADS-B data of flights falling within an approximately
80 km diagonal bounding box centered on a given airport, for
6 airports: London Heathrow, Amsterdam Schipol, Frankfurt
Am Main, New York John F. Kennedy and Washington Dulles.
Due to the noisy nature of ADS-B, the data requires cleanup.
Concretely, we remove trajectories with more than 20% of
their barometric altitude reports missing and linearly inter-
polate any smaller gaps. Trajectories are further checked for
discontinuities in altitude or excessively high rates of climb
or descent and discarded if these features are present. Further
details can be found in App. A.
Once cleaned, we then treat this data as the input to the
‘ownship’, i.e. the ACAS X simulator runs from the point of
view of the aircraft for which we have the trajectory.
5.3 Staging Attacks
With a realistic ownship trajectory in place, we now detail how
our attacker messages are constructed and how we attempt to
find the most effective attacks for a given trajectory.
5.3.1 Attacker Behavior
As described in our threat model, we implemented a static
attacker relative to the aircraft who responds to target aircraft
interrogations. We consider two attack positions, under the
middle or end coordinate of the aircraft trajectory. This bal-
ances the complexity of the simulation while also providing
an ideal, head-on position for the attacker.
5.3.2 Attacker Inputs
As the simulator code itself treats incoming Mode S messages
as if coming from the transponder, with range and bearing
already estimated, we must carry out calculations of what the
aircraft-derived measures would be based on the attacker and
aircraft positions. This ensures that the simulation results are
realistic—arbitrary bearings and slant ranges as inputs will
certainly create positive results, but these will not map to the
real world where the attacker cannot do this.
With attacker position and aircraft altitude known, we can
calculate the real slant distance and bearing based on an at-
tacker response. Since Mode S allows the attacker to self-
report altitude, this value can be picked arbitrarily. How-
ever, this will affect the calculated horizontal distance—as
discussed in Sec. 4, a small altitude difference with a large
slant distance leads to a similarly large horizontal distance.
Throughout the attack, our attacker uses altitudes relative to
the target aircraft, allowing them to ‘follow’ the target. This
guarantees that the injected aircraft will cross the path of
the target aircraft and keeps it within the vertical protected
volume.
5.3.3 Target Behaviour
Since a successful attack may require the target aircraft to
change its altitude, we must accommodate some response to
that in order to get accurate results. We make some simplify-
ing assumptions which capture the response without the finer
details of pilot input. Specifically, if an RA requires a vertical
rate change, we presume the target follows this immediately
then returns to their original intention. For example, if the
target is flying level then receives a climb RA, they follow the
climb then continue to fly at their new level.
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Figure 4: Example cost maps across attacker optimization
parameters for two trajectories, comparing how some trajecto-
ries have a clear best cost whilst others have multiple peaks.
After an RA in the real world, ATC would contact the air-
craft involved and issue instructions about how to proceed. In
a simulated environment with two aircraft over a short period
of time, we do not need these more complex instructions.
5.3.4 Optimisation of Attack
While we have a broad idea of trajectories which might cause
CAS alarms, the complexity of collision avoidance rules make
it hard to know where the ‘best’ attack lies. As we do not know
the ideal attack positions, hand picking attack strategies will
not give a good representation of how successful an attacker
can be against a given trajectory. To find a good attack strat-
egy for each trajectory, we used batch gradient ascent with
random restart. We allow up to 20 iterations per trajectory—
by inspection, runs hit local maxima multiple times in this
length. We run each phase until the cost did not increase for
some number of iterations, to allow traversal along cost func-
tion edges, or only decreases. At this point, we restart with a
random strategy.
The injected aircraft follows a linear trajectory during runs,
moving from a start altitude to end altitude at a given rate.
Note that the attacker transmits towards the aircraft so the
injected aircraft will be at the same bearing as the attacker to
the target. We allow the optimization to vary three parameters:
• Crossing point, the point in the run where the attacker
crosses the target’s altitude, i.e. is at the same altitude,
between 0 and 1 where 1 is the final position of the
aircraft in the trajectory.
• Rate, or the vertical rate of change of altitude per simu-
lation cycle, in feet per second, between -84 to 84. This
corresponds to high rates of climb or descent for passen-
ger aircraft based on data from the Eurocontrol Aircraft
Performance Database [12]. This is referred to as vertical
rate.
• Attacker position, as a choice between two positions:
underneath middle or end position of the target trajectory.
Table 1: Altitude trends over the course of trajectories,
grouped into descending, flying level or climbing by airport.
Descending Level Climbing
# % # % # %
Amsterdam 502 50.2 405 40.5 73 7.3
Frankfurt 494 49.4 390 39.0 116 11.6
New York JFK 539 53.9 242 24.2 219 21.9
Heathrow 554 55.4 278 27.8 168 16.8
San Francisco 495 49.5 251 25.1 254 25.4
Washington DC 537 53.7 304 30.4 159 15.9
Total 2763 46.1 2103 35.0 1134 18.9
We start each optimization run with a random strategy and
at each step calculate the cost of small changes in each of
these three parameters. We use an exponentially decreasing
learning strategy for each phase, resetting on a random restart.
5.3.5 Measurement Criteria
In order to optimize as above, we defined a simple cost func-
tion based on the severity of alerts in CAS. We use several
metrics which help to quantify the length and impact of an
attack. In particular, we are interested in how long:
1. the injected aircraft is proximate, tPA,
2. the target is in a Traffic Alert state, tTA,
3. the target is in a Resolution Advisory state, tRA,
4. the longest continuous RA is, lRA,
5. RA is active and requires a vertical rate change, tV R.
These criteria are in ascending order of importance. For
example, an attack strategy which causes an RA alarm for one
step is a nuisance but unlikely to have safety consequences
beyond distraction. However, if the attacker can induce long
RAs with predictable rate changes, they may create dangerous
situations for the target aircraft and others nearby.
Since RAs and non-zero vertical rate changes are highest
priority, our cost function for some run x can be expressed as:
C(x) = 1tPA +2tTA +5tRA +5lRA +10tV R (4)
As discussed above, we cannot predict the best possible
attack, so using such a cost function allows us to measure this.
In many cases, the trajectories have clear peaks or plateaus
in the cost function as shown in Fig. 4a; however, some tra-
jectories have multiple separate peaks as in Fig. 4b. Random
restart helps us to avoid getting stuck on local maxima.
6 Vulnerability Analysis
We now present our analysis of the simulation output, fo-
cussing on the real-world potential for an attacker to suc-
cessfully interfere with airborne CAS. As discussed above,
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Figure 5: Probability density plot for the number of simulation
steps spent in an RA, separated by aircraft descending, level
and climbing. Descending aircraft more likely suffer RAs.
Table 2: Summary of the number of runs which, with their
best scoring attacks, had instances of TAs, RAs and RAs with
a non-zero target vertical rate and were partly contained in
our modelling constraints. Percentages are of all trajectories.
Has TAs Has RAs Vert. Rate Partly Cont.
# % # % # % # %
AMS 614 61.4 568 56.8 561 56.1 618 61.8
FRA 491 49.1 411 41.1 380 38.0 471 47.1
JFK 515 51.5 387 38.7 218 21.8 489 48.9
LHR 798 79.8 630 63.0 554 55.4 725 72.5
SFO 617 61.7 457 45.7 372 37.2 659 65.9
IAD 229 22.9 187 18.7 158 15.8 259 25.9
Total 3264 54.4 2640 44.0 2243 37.4 3221 53.7
we extracted data from OpenSky for six airports with com-
prehensive coverage: London Heathrow (LHR), Amsterdam
Schipol (AMS), Frankfurt am Main (FRA), New York John
F. Kennedy (JFK), San Francisco International (SFO) and
Washington Dulles (IAD).
Across all airports, the input trajectories had a median run
length of 236 steps, with a standard deviation σ of 153 steps.
Of these, 2763 were descending, 2103 were flying level and
1134 were climbing. We summarize these figures by airport in
Tab. 1. The trajectories came from a wide range of altitudes,
with a median starting altitude of 15976 ft (σ: 8911 ft) and
ending altitude of 12976 ft (σ: 9871 ft). The median altitude
over the length of all trajectories was 14501 ft (σ: 9179 ft).
6.1 Attack Success
At a high level, 3264 (54.4%) of tested trajectories had one
or more simulation steps with an active TA, 2640 (44.0%)
had one or more steps with an active RA and 2243 (37.4%,
or 85.0% of the active RA steps) saw the CAS require a non-
zero vertical rate. As we discuss below, aircraft not falling
Table 3: Target altitude trends for aircraft fully or partly (i.e.
starts or ends) within theoretically vulnerable bounds.
Partly
Contained
Fully
Contained
All
Trajectories
RAs Runs % RAs Runs % RAs Runs %
Desc. 1793 2177 82.4 1350 1571 85.9 1872 2763 67.8
Level 398 660 60.3 397 658 60.3 423 2103 20.1
Climb. 271 384 70.6 192 227 84.6 345 1134 30.4
Total 2462 3221 76.4 1939 2456 78.9 2640 6000 44.0
into this group also are impacted as they may have to level off,
i.e. have a target vertical rate of 0. Thus, while an attacker is
unlikely to be successful for every trajectory, when they can
trigger an alert, there is a high likelihood of a kinetic effect.
By airport, Heathrow was the most vulnerable (see Tab. 2),
with 63.0% of runs having at least one RA and the vast major-
ity of those RA runs resulting in a non-zero target vertical rate
requirement (87.9%). We investigate this further below. Ams-
terdam is the next most vulnerable in terms of RAs (56.8%),
with Washington DC having the lowest percentage of runs
result in an RA at 18.7%.
6.1.1 Trajectory Altitude Trend
While airports show some difference in attacker success, the
altitude trend of trajectories, namely whether the aircraft is
climbing, flying level or descending, has a clearer split. In
Fig. 5, we provide a probability density plot for the number of
simulation steps spent in an RA, with a line for each altitude
trend. First, it confirms that many flights have no, or very few,
cycles in an RA. However, of the trajectories which do result
in RAs, the vast majority are for descending aircraft. Looking
to where most of the trajectories lie, in the 10-45 steps with
an RA, a descending trajectory is over twice as vulnerable.
When considered in context, this is the scenario where
an aircraft is flying most directly towards an attacker, which
rapidly shortens the distance between the attacker and the
target. Here, a false aircraft injected into the CAS will cause
it to believe that it is on a collision course. This suggests that
the attack is particularly successful during approach, which is
a high-workload time for pilots and a busy part of airspace.
6.1.2 Verification of Theoretically Vulnerable Altitudes
In Sec. 4 we modelled that aircraft in the altitude range 2350-
13306 ft are the most exposed to injection attacks. Our results
from the ACAS X simulator support this. Across successfully
attacked trajectories, the median start altitude was 9775 ft (σ:
4790 ft) and end altitude was 6875 ft (σ: 4382 ft). The median
of averages across each trajectory was 8488 ft (σ: 4149 ft),
which along with the start and end altitudes, is comfortably
inside the vulnerable range. We summarize the results, along
with the relevant altitude trends, in Tab. 3, denoting both
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Figure 6: Probability density plot of the maximum difference
between original and attacked trajectory for targeted aircraft.
Descending and level aircraft have greater chance of causing
deviations than climbing, but have lower average deviations.
trajectories which start and end within the bounds (fully con-
tained) and those which start or end within the bounds (partly
contained). Note that partly contained is a superset of fully
contained.
The results show aircraft are more vulnerable in this range.
For trajectories both starting and ending within 2350-13306 ft,
1939 of the 2456 (78.9%) matching trajectories suffered RAs.
For those, which either start or end within it, 2462 of 3221
(76.4%) trajectories suffered RAs. Both are almost twice as
vulnerable compared to the full set of trajectories (44.0%).
Taking into account altitude trends, descending trajectories
saw an 18 percentage point increase over all trajectories, while
climbing and flying level increased almost three times over
(54% and 40% respectively). Only 79 descending, 25 level
and 74 climbing trajectories that do not at least partly fall in
our boundaries have RAs, indicating that aircraft at altitudes
outside of this band are less susceptible to attack.
These insights help explain the airport split in Tab. 2,
where Washington DC has the lowest success rate for RAs at
18.7%. We can see that it also has the fewest partly contained
trajectories—slightly over half the next lowest, JFK.
6.1.3 RA Length
Looking more closely at the cases where attackers do generate
RAs, we can measure the length of a typical continuous en-
counter that the attack might cause. Across all trajectories, the
median ‘longest run’ of an RA was 25 steps with a standard
deviation of 14, where one step is one second. The ratio of
‘longest RA run length’ to the total length of the trajectory
for all trajectories had median value of 11.4% with a standard
deviation of 17.9%. When compared to RA lengths in the real
world, the absolute length matches quite closely—in analysis
conducted by Eurocontrol, they found the average RA length
to be 33 seconds [7].
The trend of the trajectory appears to have some effect on
its length. Climbing and level trajectories had the longest RA
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Figure 7: Histograms of the distributions of the largest altitude
deviations across climbing, level and descending trajectories.
Most attacks leave the target below its original trajectory.
runs: climb had a median length of 26 steps (σ: 15), whereas
descending a median length of 25 (σ: 14). Level trajectories
had slightly shorter runs on average—a median length of 22
steps (σ: 16), possibly as a result of higher closing speeds
whilst flying at a given altitude, or not following a traffic
pattern around the airport thus reducing exposure.
6.2 Impact of Attacker-Induced RAs
Although triggering an RA could be seen as a success by
itself, an attack is unlikely to have much effect if it does not
cause any kinetic effect. We can measure this by comparing
the trajectory of the best strategy against the original input
trajectory, specifically looking at the altitude deviation.
In Fig. 6 we show the probability density of altitude dis-
placement for trajectories in which the target aircraft has an
RA for at least one simulation step. Descending and level tar-
get aircraft have similar distributions, with a median of 579 ft
and 584 ft respectively. Climbing aircraft have a considerably
higher median deviation at 901 ft.
It does not appear that trajectories falling within the vulner-
able bounds outlined previously have significantly different
outcomes compared to all trajectories. For the fully contained
trajectories, climbing trajectories saw a median maximum de-
viation of 804 ft, with level at 584 ft and descending at 559 ft.
Partly contained trajectories saw a slightly higher climbing
median maximum deviation of 880 ft, with level and descend-
ing at 584 ft and 583 ft respectively.
Under normal conditions (i.e. no CAS alert) this would
cause a level bust, which is a situation where an aircraft de-
viates more than 300 ft from its assigned altitude [45]. Al-
though these deviations may not be classed as a level bust
since they are part of a collision avoidance maneuver, they
10
                         
 9 H U W L F D O  5 D W H  & K D Q J H   I W  V 
     
     
     
     
     
     
 '
 H Q
 V L
 W \
 ' H V F
 / H Y H O
 & O L P E
Figure 8: Density plot of the vertical rate change for the best
strategy causing RAs. These are split into the altitude trends
of climbing, flying level and descending. The median values
show that the attacker must have a vertical rate in the same
trend as the target to be successful.
would still incur the same potential harms. Specifically, this
might cause the target aircraft to become too close to another
nearby aircraft and cause further CAS alerts. It will also in-
crease workload for air traffic controllers who may now have
to adjust instructions for nearby aircraft.
Maximum altitude deviation alone does not describe the
full impact. Fig. 7 shows three histograms of the largest alti-
tude deviations from the original trajectories, split by flight
phase. The median greatest deviation for climbing aircraft
was −843 ft, level was −331 ft and descending was −118 ft.
Trajectories falling outside of the vulnerable 2350-13306 ft
window differed; climbing trajectories had a median great-
est difference of −916 ft, level was −409 ft and descending
was 304 ft. The larger difference in descending trajectories
suggests that aircraft outside the window were more likely to
have a level-off RA and end up above their original path.
6.3 Attacker Strategy Analysis
Finally, we look at the attacker-controller parameters used
in the optimization process. This meta-analysis helps us to
understand whether an attacker can pick an optimal position
for a given trajectory to have the greatest chance of success.
From a defender’s point of view, this helps us to understand
when an aircraft is most vulnerable to attack. We consider all
trajectories with RAs as there was no significant parameter
difference between those inside or outside of the bounds.
Over the full set of runs, trajectories suffering RAs had a
median altitude change rate of −12.9 ft/s (σ: 40.1), crossing
point of 0.64 (σ: 0.29) with the attacker positions being split
almost equally; 1424 (53.9%) of successful runs were in the
‘middle’ position, with the remaining 1216 (46.1%) being at
the end. In general, this suggests that an attacker injecting a
descending aircraft which crosses the target aircraft’s altitude
Attacker Injected
Aircraft
Target
Aircraft
x
(a) Large x when aircraft have the
same vertical rate sign.
Attacker Injected
Aircraft
Target Aircraftx
(b) Small x when aircraft have oppo-
site vertical rate sign.
Figure 9: Effect on path angle between the target and attacker-
injected aircraft when the attacker uses the a vertical rate with
the same or opposite sign.
around the half-way point of the target trajectory will give the
best chance of success. However, as shown above, the success
rate varies depends on trajectory characteristics.
Crossing point and attacker position are strongly linked,
with most RA-generating runs being clustered around the me-
dian for both end- and mid-positioned attackers. Successful
mid-position attackers have a median position at 0.497 (σ:
0.221) and end-positioned are 0.985 (σ: 0.228), if we repre-
sent trajectories as unit length. Nominally, this corresponds
to the crossover happening when the target is directly above
the attacker. This is reasonable as it is also the point when
the slant range between the attacker and the target is at a
minimum.
6.3.1 Vertical Rate Effect
We previously explored the relationship between trajectory
altitude trend and attacker success. Of the three parameters,
vertical rate change is the most significantly affected and is
presented in a density plot in Fig. 8. Descending and level tra-
jectories have the most RAs at rates just below 0, specifically
medians of−18.5 ft/s (σ: 37.7) and−5.1 ft/s (σ: 33.4) respec-
tively. Climbing trajectories have a much higher median rate
change at 27.8 ft/s (σ: 31.8).
When the best attacker vertical rate for each trajectory is
compared to the average altitude rate change for the input
trajectory, the Spearman correlation coefficient is 0.482.2 This
positive correlation indicates that in many cases, the best
attacking vertical rate has the same sign as the target vertical
rate. In some senses, this is counterintuitive as one might
expect RAs to be most common when where the injected
aircraft flies ‘head on’ to the target by having the opposite
vertical rate.
An explanation for this could be related to the amount of
movement required by both aircraft to avoid a collision. If
we consider the case where the injected and target aircraft
are on paths which intersect, the target will need to adjust its
path such that they no longer intersect. This involves reducing
the intersection angle as quickly as possible, i.e. through
2We use Spearman rather than Pearson as we do not know if the underly-
ing altitudes are normally distributed and the barometric altitude reported is
ordinal, quantized into at least 25 ft steps [37].
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following an RA. When the target and injected aircraft have
opposite signs in their vertical rate as in Fig 9a, they have an
obtuse angle between their intersecting paths. Deconflicting
will involve increasing this angle over time until the aircraft
are at least on parallel paths, which is a relatively small change.
In contrast, when the signs are the same as in Fig 9b, the angle
is acute and significantly larger changes are required to avoid
the intersection. This causes greater deviation by the target to
create separation, resulting in a long RA.
7 Key Insights
Attack Strategy We demonstrate that attacks on CAS are
feasible and allow attackers to cause kinetic impact. There
are significant variations in success chance depending on
attacker position relative to the aircraft and aircraft behavior.
Whereas random attacks have a success chance of 44% in our
simulations, it increases considerably to about 80%, when the
attacker focusses on aircraft flying at ‘vulnerable’ altitudes.
Furthermore, we showed that the flight phase of the target
aircraft—i.e. if it is climbing, descending or flying level—is
correlated to attack success and impact type. We found that:
• Level aircraft would suffer unplanned climbs or descents,
• Climbing aircraft would often have to level off, resulting
in a considerably lower than intended trajectory,
• Descending aircraft face a range of consequences, in-
cluding having to level off, ending up above the planned
altitude, or expediting descent and finishing below.
Of these scenarios, the descending aircraft is arguably the
most concerning and formed the greatest proportion of our
successful attacks. On such a path the aircraft is likely to be at
vulnerable altitudes for longer than climbing or level aircraft.
This increases both exposure to an attack and possible impact.
Finally, we found that the optimal attacker strategy is de-
termined by the target trajectory. Our results suggest that
attackers are most successful when injecting aircraft which
cross the altitude of the target when the target is overhead.
On top of this, the vertical rate change of the injected aircraft
causes the greatest effect when it has the same sign to the
target vertical rate.
Attack Effects A successful CAS attack has direct effects
on the flight crew and the path of the aircraft. Across all suc-
cessful attacks, the kinetic effect induced was enough to have
wider consequences. Based purely on the magnitude of the
deviations, an average attack would result in the aircraft being
at least 500 ft from its original trajectory, which is enough
to cause a level bust. While level busts will only apply in
some situations, ripple effects on the complex systems of
busy airspaces are both likely and unpredictable.
Although an attack focusses on a specific aircraft, its effects
could be felt far beyond that. Considering that these RAs
would arise from false aircraft not necessarily appearing on
radar, this is likely to catch ATC by surprise. This may require
a controller to have to immediately reorganize nearby airspace
to ensure all aircraft are safe—especially in cases where RAs
result in extreme climbing or descending.
Furthermore, the most vulnerable altitudes are commonly
close to airports, which in turn means they are likely to be
high-traffic sections of airspace. Aircraft are tightly controlled
here and deviations could cause many aircraft to either receive
adjusted ATC instructions or have CAS alerts of their own.
An example of where this would be particularly concerning is
in holding stacks, where aircraft fly patterns usually separated
by 1000 ft. An induced level bust because of an RA could
cause many aircraft to have RAs in quick succession [11].
The less immediate consequences also need to be consid-
ered carefully as they are of potentially even wider-ranging
importance. As highlighted in previous work, pilots are effec-
tive at spotting unusual behavior in their systems but doing so
draws their attention and diverts it away from other cockpit
tasks [46]. If they feel the system is performing unusually,
they are likely to reduce its sensitivity, switch it off or report
it to ATC. CAS are important safety nets, having prevented
many mid-air collisions globally since introduction [42]. Thus,
effective denial of service attacks, which result in the system
being turned off for the flight or undermine the trust in the
system more generally are of potentially very high impact.
Similarly, if ATC notice many RAs occurring in an area,
they can close that section of airspace or reroute aircraft—
highly disruptive activities in and of themselves. Although
both situations would stop the attacker having an effect, they
also have considerable cost. Switching off CAS results in
more work for ATC to keep the aircraft separated. Having to
divert traffic could have knock-on effects including low-fuel
incidents or diversions to other airports.
8 Countermeasures
As with many systems underpinned by avionic communica-
tions, adding cryptographic measures to the link would re-
quire system redesign, standardization and certification. This
is both expensive and time consuming so would not address
the issue in the short term [49].
An additional challenge exists for CAS, however. As with
many safety systems, delayed or dropped messages have the
potential to cause unsafe situations; more concretely, if two
or more aircraft could not verify each others’ identity and no
fallback was allowed, collision avoidance would struggle to
work as aircraft-to-aircraft communication would not be pos-
sible. Furthermore, both TCAS and ACAS X rely on passive
observation of Mode C or S transmissions, meaning that the
CAS must be able to verify any possible aircraft nearby too,
whilst fulfilling its collision avoidance function.
Because of this, countermeasures to attacks on CAS must
not impinge on their performance. Whilst a cryptographically
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Figure 10: Heatmap of cost function output for 100 trajecto-
ries at vulnerable altitudes around Frankfurt Airport.
protected CAS might be possible, in the shorter-term other
defence mechanisms will provide immediate protection. We
present two main forms: ground- and aircraft-based measures.
8.1 Ground-based Measures
Carrying out the attack described in this paper requires a high
transmission power over a sustained period of time—up to
500 W at times to match the Mode S standard [36]. Not only
is such a transmission far higher power than would be allowed
in the nearby spectrum, but the section of the spectrum itself is
reserved for aviation [8,30,50]. Because of this, a monitoring
system could identify the attacker transmissions and at least
provide an alert that an attack could be happening. A more
comprehensive system could provide some localization.
However, even if we presume the attacker is in the vicin-
ity of an airport, the attack can be carried out over a wide
area. Deploying sensors to comprehensively cover an area
of around 3000 km2 would be extremely costly. Instead, we
propose that our simulation approach can be used to model
which areas are likely to be vulnerable to attack. By position-
ing the in-simulator attacker in a grid of points surrounding
a given airport, we can produce costs for each grid position.
Run across a range of trajectories, the simulator can produce
an average cost per grid position over these flight paths.
To demonstrate this, we used a grid of 36 points distributed
evenly around Frankfurt airport and within the bounds of
our original data collection. We ran 100 trajectories classed
as ‘fully contained’ according to our theoretical bounding
exercise and plotted the mean cost as a heatmap in Fig. 10.
With a limited run, we can identify areas with a higher average
cost—specifically one towards the south stands out. Such
analysis allows air traffic management to understand which
approach or departure patterns might be vulnerable to attack.
8.2 Aircraft-based Measures
Although monitoring and detection systems help to identify
an attack in progress, this does mean that some aircraft will be
under attack until the attacker can be located. To help mitigate
this, some measures onboard the aircraft could be adopted.
Some adaptations to the ongoing ACAS X implementation
might be possible, including gathering more signal informa-
tion and anomalous movement detection. At the signal level,
CAS works separately from the transponder; the transpon-
der handles the reception and decoding of a message before
passing it over to CAS. As such, the CAS will have limited
information about the underlying signal. One approach might
be to provide more signal information either to CAS or a
separate security device which monitors characteristics such
as signal strength, timing, directionality and range.
Anomaly detection could be carried out with this richer
information from the transponder. This might include moni-
toring intruders for unusual movement patterns, excessively
high vertical rates or significant jumps in position. In our at-
tacks, injected aircraft trajectories typically formed clusters
of estimated positions above where the attacker was located.
Fixed wing aircraft would not typically behave in this way.
Importantly, we do not suggest dropping all anomalous data as
we cannot be sure it is attacker-generated. Instead, this could
be flagged to flight crew who would then be able to use the
information when responding to any CAS alerts generated.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we have identified that, subject to some altitude
constraints, a suitably equipped attacker can carry out injec-
tion attacks on collision avoidance systems. By analyzing
the workings of CAS systems, we highlighted that aircraft
flying between the altitudes of 2350-13306 ft are at the op-
timal combination of altitude and speed for a ground-based
injection attack to be successful. We then tested this by har-
nessing standardized collision avoidance code from ACAS
X, showing that across six airports in the US and Europe, an
attacker had a 40-50% chance of success for all aircraft in
the area. However, when just considering the aircraft flying
between 2350-13306 ft, the attacker was considerably more
successful—almost doubly so in some cases.
The consequences of such an attack are significant. While
causing mid-air collisions is unlikely, this attack causes direct
disruption with the potential effects rippling out and effecting
many aircraft nearby. We propose that to manage the risk
of this attack, air traffic managers could use our simulation
approach to map out high-risk areas and deploy monitoring
systems there. Onboard the aircraft, the in-development status
of ACAS X could allow for some additional security fea-
tures to be considered, specifically around anomaly detection
applied to intruder messages.
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A Trajectory Preparation Pipeline
Data as reported by aircraft and stored on the OpenSky Net-
work can have irregularities such as altitude spikes or gaps
with no reporting. This can be due to sensor quirks, process-
ing delay or faulty reporting by the aircraft. For our simulator,
we wanted clean input trajectories in order to monitor ACAS
X behavior as accurately as possible. To produce these trajec-
tories, we used a pipeline with the following steps:
1. Group flights by Mode S address and split into ‘flight
trajectories’, based on gaps of 60 seconds with no ADS-
B reporting.
2. Remove trajectories with more than 20% of their baro-
metric altitude reports missing. For remaining trajec-
tories, linearly interpolate gaps between start and end
values surrounding the gap. Gaps at the start or end of
the trajectory are trimmed off.
3. Trajectories are thresholded based on minimum and max-
imum altitudes, in order to remove unreliable low alti-
tude reporting and high-altitude reporting. We included
aircraft outside of our window of interest as defined in
Sec. 4 in order to test whether aircraft at other altitudes
are vulnerable.
4. Trajectories are further checked for discontinuities in
altitude or excessively high rates of climb or descent,
and discarded if these features are present.
This pipeline produces trajectories with few disruptive arte-
facts due to ADS-B quirks. Specifically, Step 3 removes ex-
tremely noisy data occurring below 3750 ft where we found
barometric altitude reporting to be significantly less accurate.
We also remove cruise altitude aircraft, i.e. above 30000 ft, as
our bounding in Sec. 4 identifies these as an unrealistic target.
Similarly, those with unrealistic movements in altitude are re-
moved in Step 4. We used a maximum climb of 5000 feet per
minute and descent of 4500 as thresholds, based on surveying
civilian aircraft performance data from the Eurocontrol Air
Performance Database [12].
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